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ABSTRACT
Irrespective of the success of climate mitigation efforts, societies worldwide 
face the challenge of adapting to a changing climate. In this paper, we 
examine UK residents’ expectations of future threats and opportunities 
associated with climate change impacts, along with willingness to prioritise 
different climate change impacts for investment. Using a national survey 
(n = 2007), we report on three main findings. First, UK residents tend to expect 
threats related to flooding and wet weather to be more likely and concerning 
than heat extremes or opportunities. Second, UK residents’ expectations of 
climate change impacts do not align with expert assessments, especially 
showing lower estimates of heat-related threats as compared to experts. 
Third, willingness to allocate resources to potential climate change impacts 
tends to be more strongly associated with anticipated concern should 
they occur than climate change belief or the expected likelihood of them 
occurring. We discuss the implications of our findings for policies and 
communications about climate change adaptation in the UK and elsewhere.
1. Introduction
Regardless of the success of ongoing global climate change mitigation efforts, past emissions have 
already committed the world to some level of climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2014). Countries worldwide, therefore, face the challenge of adapting to climate change impact 
(Moss et al. 2013). Public support for climate change adaptation policy may determine how effectively 
countries will be able to manage the threats and opportunities posed by climate change impacts. The UK’s 
National Adaptation Plan envisions an active role for both individuals and communities in preparing for 
future climate change impacts (Defra 2013). It is, therefore, important to better understand which impacts 
people believe should be prioritised for investment, and the extent to which these public adaptation pri-
orities are consistent or inconsistent with scientific recommendations and the priorities of policy-makers.
Behavioural decision research has shown that expert and non-expert assessments of risk often differ, 
with experts applying formal models of risk analysis, and non-experts drawing on characteristics that are 
not included in these models, such as emotional response and the ease with which examples of threats 
and benefits come to mind (Bruine de Bruin and Bostrom 2013). This should not be taken to mean that 
risk assessments made by scientific experts are wholly objective and free of bias, nor that non-experts 
are incorrect to draw on factors beyond those used in formal risk assessments in perceiving risk. Indeed, 
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2  A. TAYLOR ET AL.
the question of which factors should be included in formal assessments of climate change risk – such 
as how harm should be conceptualised – has been a subject for debate, as has ability of traditional risk 
analysis to capture the information needed for climate change policy and decision-making (Hultman, 
Hassenzahl, and Rayner 2010). Nonetheless, differences in the way that domain experts and non-experts 
assess risks can lead to failures in communication and disparities in expectations between these groups 
(Bruine de Bruin and Bostrom 2013). Moreover, while ease of recall and emotional response to risk are 
often adaptive in terms of efficiently guiding behaviour, when they are not well calibrated with the actual 
likelihood of threats occurring, or the severity of the consequences that would be experienced if they 
occur, they may lead to maladaptive decision-making (Slovic et al. 2004; Tversky and Kahneman 1973).
The UK’s 2012 and 2017 national Climate Change Risk Assessments (CCRAs) have been produced by 
climate experts for policy-makers on the basis of outputs from scientific models. Specifically, both the 
2012 and 2017 assessments project that a changing climate will lead to an increase in threats such as 
heatwaves, water shortages, flooding, wildlife loss, as well as opportunities, such as potential reduc-
tions in winter energy consumption and lower cold-weather morbidity (Committee on Climate Change 
2016; Defra 2012).Yet, UK residents’ climate change concerns seem to be most strongly associated with 
perceptions of increases in wet weather (Taylor, Bruine de Bruin, and Dessai 2014; Whitmarsh 2009). 
These findings have been attributed to the availability and affect heuristics (Slovic et al. 2007; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1973). That is to say that amongst UK residents, hot weather may be less available from 
memory than wet weather, while also evoking more positive affect or emotions (Lefevre et al. 2015; 
Palutikof, Agnew, and Hoar 2004). It has been found that those who feel more positive about hot weather 
are less likely to implement heat protection behaviours (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2016; Lefevre et al. 2015), 
which raises concerns that those living in temperate regions may be ill-prepared for climate change 
impacts associated with heat. Hence, these psychological barriers could compound the documented 
struggle to build adaptive capacity among UK households (Porter, Dessai, and Tompkins 2014).
Yet, experienced changes in weather may be more compelling than the abstract notion of climate 
change (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006; Swim et al. 2009). Indeed, it has been found that perceived per-
sonal experience of climate change through local weather predicts intention to engage in mitigation 
(Broomell, Budescu, and Por 2015). In the context of adaptation, recent research conducted in the U.S. 
has also found that support for flood adaptation measures is higher among individuals who perceive 
flood risks to be increasing, independent of their concerns about climate change (Bruine de Bruin, 
Wong-Parodi, and Morgan 2014). Hence, the extent to which willingness to prioritise specific impacts 
for investment is predicted by these factors warrants exploration.
In this paper, we therefore address the following research questions:
(1)  What are UK residents’ expectations and priorities with respect to climate change impacts?
(2)  How do UK residents’ expectations of potential climate change impacts compare to expert 
assessments?
(3)  To what extent do expected impact likelihood, anticipated concern about impacts and beliefs 
about climate change predict willingness to allocate resources to specific impacts?
2. Method
We present a secondary analysis of survey data collected for the PREPARE (Programme of Research on 
Preparedness, Adaptation and Risk) research programme led by Ipsos MORI (Ipsos MORI 2013). The pro-
gramme was funded by the UK government’s Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).
2.1. Participants
Between 30 January and 5 February 2013, Ipsos MORI conducted the survey with a national UK sample. 
The sample included 2007 panel members, 1028 of whom were female (51.2%). Ages ranged from 16 
to 94 (M = 47.0, SD = 18.2), with 816 (40.1%) having a university degree.
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2.2. Measures
Below, we describe the measures relevant to our analyses, in the order in which they appeared in the 
survey. Participants were given the opportunity to answer ‘Don’t Know’ to each question, which was 
coded as a missing response.
2.2.1. Expected likelihood of and anticipated concern about specific impacts
Each participant rated 10 potential climate change impacts for their likelihood of occurring in the UK 
by 2050 (recoded as: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree), as well as for their concern if they did 
occur (recoded as: 1 = not at all concerned; 4 = very concerned). These climate change impacts were 
randomly selected from a set of 19 (see Table 1), which were identified by the UK government’s 2012 
Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) (Defra 2012). As in the 2012 CCRA, impacts were classified as 
‘Threats’, ‘Opportunities’ or ‘Both’.
2.2.2. Prioritisation of impacts
Participants were asked to indicate which potential climate change impacts should be prioritised in 
government adaptation policy. To this end, they distributed 15 tokens amongst the 10 climate change 
impacts for which they had also rated their likelihood and concern (see Section 2.2.1).
2.2.3. Climate change belief
Climate change belief was assessed with a three-item scale. Participants rated how convinced they were 
that climate change was currently affecting the planet and the UK (1 = not at all convinced; 4 = totally 
convinced), as well as how concerned they were about climate change (1 = not at all concerned; 4 = very 
concerned). Principal Components Analysis indicated that the three items loaded onto a single con-
struct. An overall measure of climate change belief was computed by taking the mean score of the 
three items (Cronbach’s alpha = .93).
2.3. Expert assessments of climate change impacts
To examine the extent to which participants’ expectations of climate change impacts corresponded 
with expert assessments of the magnitude of their consequences, we used the 2012 UK Climate Change 
Risk Assessment (CCRA) (Defra 2012). The 2012 CCRA provides categorical (High, Medium and Low) 
ratings of ‘Consequence’ to denote how strongly positive or strongly negative experts project that the 
consequence of climate change impacts would be under a UK Climate Projections 2009 range. Some 
of the survey items encompassed multiple impacts from the 2012 CCRA. For those, we selected the 
impacts with the highest-ranked consequence for comparison (See the Supplemental Material for a 
full comparison of survey items with CCRA 2012 impacts). In comparing participants’ expectations with 
expert assessments of the magnitude of impact consequence, we use the 2012 CCRA rather than the 
more recent 2017 CCRA for two reasons. Firstly, the 2012 CCRA was the most contemporary source of 
expert projections for the UK at the time at which the survey was conducted; with the impacts included 
in the survey having been directly informed by the 2012 CCRA. Secondly, the 2017 CCRA evidence 
reports do not consistently provide ratings of consequence for individual impacts, opting in many 
instances group-related impacts and assign a rating of urgency rather than anticipated consequence 
(Committee on Climate Change 2016).
The ratings of urgency included in the 2017 CCRA do however exist as a recommendation to prioritise 
types of impacts for immediate action (in order of most immediately urgent to least urgent: (1) More 
action needed, (2) Research priority, (3) Maintain current action, (4) Watching brief ). Hence, as the 2012 
CCRA did not include these, we discuss participants’ willingness to prioritise impacts with reference to 
the 2017 CCRA’s ratings of urgency for different types of impact (See the Supplemental Material for a 
comparison of survey items with CCRA 2017 impact categories)
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3. Results
3.1. What are UK residents’ expectations and priorities with respect to climate change 
impacts?
Bonferroni-corrected one-sample t-tests were used to examine whether participants agreed that 
impacts were likely to occur in the UK by 2050 (Table 1). For all but three impacts, agreement was sig-
nificantly above the scale midpoint of 3 (neither agree nor disagree). However, agreement tended to 
be comparatively low for opportunities, and for threats to humans and infrastructure from hot weather. 
Indeed, impacts perceived as least likely to occur were: ‘More people permanently move to the UK 
because of changes in the climate of their own country’, ‘Lower demand for energy due to warmer 
winters’ and ‘More tourists choosing to visit the UK because of a warmer climate’. The three impacts felt 
to be most likely to occur were: ‘More homes being flooded as a result of heavy rainfall’, ‘Poor harvests, 
due to extreme weather, pushing up food prices’ and ‘Low lying coasts being permanently flooded or 
eroded by rising sea levels’.
Table 1 shows a similar response pattern with respect to participants’ anticipated concern should the 
impacts happen in the future, although water shortages and immigration were ranked as considerably 
more concerning than likely to occur. Bonferroni-corrected one-sample t-tests indicated that anticipated 
concern regarding opportunities was below the scale median of 2.5 (between ‘a little concerned’ and 
‘fairly concerned’). By contrast, concerns about all threats were rated significantly above the scale mid-
point. Concern was strongest for threats directly related to food supply, water supply and residential 
flood risk. However, less concern was seen for threats to infrastructure and dwellings from heat extremes 
(‘Cities and large towns, which trap heat, becoming unbearably hot due to heat waves’ and ‘Disruption 
to trains, roads, and public transport due to more frequent heat waves’) than for wet-weather threats 
(‘More homes being flooded as a result of heavy rainfall’ and ‘Public services like roads, power stations, 
schools and hospitals being disrupted as a result of heavy rainfall’).
Table 1 also shows the mean number of tokens allocated to each impact, across participants. 
Bonferroni-corrected one-sample t-tests examined whether mean allocation for each impact signifi-
cantly diverged from the equal distribution point of 1.5 per impact (15 tokens divided by the 10 impacts 
each participant evaluated). While the average number of allocated tokens was relatively low for all 
impacts, clear patterns in prioritisation do emerge, with resource allocation mirroring anticipated con-
cern. We see that participants allocated more resources to addressing threats than taking advantage of 
opportunities, with mean allocation to opportunities being significantly below 1.5. The highest mean 
allocation went to threats related to food supply, water supply and residential flood risk. In contrast, 
allocation to opportunities and threats related to wildlife, coastal flooding and impacts on infrastructure 
and dwellings from heat extremes were either significantly below or failed to exceed the 1.5 threshold.
3.2. How do UK residents’ expectations of potential climate change impacts compare to 
expert assessments?
Consistent with expert assessments of high-negative consequence for: ‘More homes being flooded as 
a result of heavy rainfall’ and ‘Droughts causing serious water shortages’ in the 2012 CCRA, participant 
ratings of anticipated concern were particularly strong for these impacts. We also find that, consistent 
with an expert ranking of Low Negative Consequence, participants expressed lower concern about 
‘Disruption to trains, roads, and public transport due to more frequent heatwaves’ than other threats. 
However, participants expected ‘More people’s health suffering in extreme heat…’ (high-negative con-
sequence) and ‘Increased demand for energy for cooling…’ (medium-negative consequence) to be 
substantially less likely to occur in future than threats related to rainfall, flooding and biodiversity, 
suggesting that they expected the threat posed by these potential impacts to be lower than did experts.
With respect to adaptation priorities, we see that the number of tokens allocated to impacts by survey 
participants were often consistent with the urgency ratings used in the recent 2017 CCRA, with threats 
related to flooding of homes and infrastructure, food supply and water supply being both prioritised 
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by participants and given the highest urgency rating in the 2017 CCRA. Likewise, opportunities related 
to demand for goods and services were awarded few tokens by participants, and received the lowest 
urgency rating in the 2017 CCRA, on the grounds that businesses are used to responding to changes in 
consumer demand. There were, however, notable differences. While token allocation indicated ‘Cities 
and large towns, which trap heat, becoming unbearably hot due to heatwaves’ was not a priority for 
participants, the 2017 CCRA incorporates the urban heat island effect into ‘Risks to public health and 
wellbeing from high temperatures’: a set of threats receiving the highest urgency rating due to a cur-
rent lack of policy regarding the adaptation of buildings to cope with heat extremes (Committee on 
Climate Change 2016).
3.3. To what extent do expected impact likelihood, anticipated concern about impacts, and 
concern about climate change predict willingness to allocate resources to specific impacts?
Examining the inter-correlations between expected likelihood, anticipated concern, and climate change 
belief for each impact (Table 2), we find a moderately strong association between these variables for 
each threat (r > .30). For opportunities, weaker associations were observed (Table 2).
To assess the independent contribution of these variables to willingness to allocated resources 
(tokens) to specific impacts1 a series of ordinary least squares linear regression analyses were conducted. 
These analyses controlled for demographic characteristics (age, gender, education). Pearson correlations 
showed that both perceived likelihood and anticipated concern were associated with willingness to allo-
cate resources, while climate change belief was associated with slightly greater willingness to allocate 
resources to impacts related to wildlife (see Supplementary Material). However, when all three variables 
were entered, only anticipated concern was consistently the independent predictor of willingness to 
allocate resources (see Table 2 for summary and Supplemental Materials for simple correlations and 
full information on all regression models). When entered into the regression, climate change belief was 
no longer positively associated with willingness to allocate resources to any of the impacts after taking 
into account expected likelihood and anticipated concern regarding impacts.
4. Discussion
Below, we discuss our three main findings, pertaining to: (1) UK residents’ expectations and priorities for 
potential climate change impacts; (2) how those compare to expert assessments and (3) the extent to 
which perceptions of future impacts and climate change belief predict resource allocation to address 
threats and taking advantage of opportunities.
4.1. Climate change impacts: expectations and priorities
Our first main finding is that UK residents tend to expect future threats related to wet weather, flooding 
and biodiversity to be more likely and more potentially concerning than either opportunities or threats 
to infrastructure from heat. However, while not necessarily perceived to be the most likely threats to 
occur, drought and threats to vulnerable groups (e.g. the elderly) from heat did elicit high concern. 
Overall, impacts that elicited greater anticipated concern were also expected to be more likely and 
received a greater priority for investment. This finding is consistent with work on the affect heuristic, 
which suggests that threats that elicit stronger negative feelings or more concern (or ‘affect’) are judged 
to pose a greater risk than those that elicit weaker negative affect or less concern (Slovic et al. 2004). 
In the UK, it has been found that many residents have relatively positive feelings towards hot weather 
(Palutikof, Agnew, and Hoar 2004), which can reduce willingness to undertake protective weather 
behaviours (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2016; Lefevre et al. 2015). This may in part explain the lower expected 
risk from threats related to hot weather, and the lower willingness to invest resources in them. The fact 
that threats related to wet weather and flooding were expected to be most likely to occur and were 
prioritised for investment is also in keeping with previous findings regarding the availability heuristic 
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(Tversky and Kahneman 1973), whereby the ease with which examples of threats are recalled is used 
as a guide to the risk they pose. At the time when the survey was conducted (January/February 2013), 
the UK had recently experienced above average seasonal rainfall and highly publicised flooding (Met 
Office 2012), likely making these threats particular salient to respondents.
Similarly, the finding that participants expected threats to be more likely than opportunities, is 
in keeping with prior work suggesting that negative information about potential losses tends to be 
more salient than positive information about potential gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Siegrist 
and Cvetkovich 2001; Taylor 1991). Thus, lay participants’ assessments diverged from those of experts 
participating in the UK government’s 2012 CCRA exercise, who expected that both threats and oppor-
tunities would be likely to emerge as a result of a changing climate. In line with these patterns, we 
also found that UK residents are less supportive of expending public resources to take advantage of 
opportunities than to protect against threats.
4.2. Public expectations and expert assessment
Our second main finding pertains to the differences between public expectations and expert assess-
ments of climate change impacts. As noted above, our participants expected threats to be relatively 
more likely than opportunities, as compared to experts. However, expectations for specific threats varied. 
Both experts’ and participants’ assessments of threats were relatively consistent with respect to the 
threats posed by flooding. In contrast, participants’ perceptions of the likelihood of threats to humans 
from hot weather indicated that they perceived these to pose less of a risk than expert assessments 
of ‘Consequence’ in the 2012 Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) would suggest. Furthermore, 
while participants’ adaptation priorities were often consistent with the ratings of ‘Urgency’ set out in 
the 2017 CCRA, threats from urban heat island effects were judged to be a low priority by participants, 
while the 2017 CCRA places these within highest urgency category. Again, this finding is in keeping 
with our prior finding that positive feelings towards hot weather amongst UK residents may diminish 
perceived threat from heat extremes (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2016; Lefevre et al. 2015).
4.3. Predicting impact priorities
Our third main finding relates to predictors of participants’ impact prioritisations. Our results show 
consistent, if modest, associations between participants’ anticipated concern about impacts and will-
ingness to allocate resources to them. After taking into account this role of anticipated concern about 
impacts, climate change belief made no additional positive contribution to resource allocations, while 
expected likelihood only made a positive contribution to three impacts. This is consistent with previous 
findings that, when it comes to making judgements about risk, people often focus on the magnitude 
of potential harms, rather than the likelihood of them occurring (March and Shapira 1987). This insen-
sitivity to probability may be especially high when potential harms evoke strong negative emotions 
(Sunstein 2002).
4.4. Limitations
As with all secondary data analyses, ours has its limitations. First, participants made hypothetical deci-
sions about resource allocation, such that they did not actually have to invest money, implement their 
chosen adaptation strategies or bear the consequences of not choosing others. Second, participants 
were not shown the same set of impacts, and may have allocated tokens differently to specific impacts 
had they been part of a different set. The large sample size, combined with the fact that the impacts 
were randomly assigned, means that we nevertheless had sufficient ability to generalise across choice 
sets. Third, our study is specific to the UK Residents in other parts of the world may have different 
expectations for climate change impacts, and preferences for resource allocations.
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4.5. Conclusions
Taken together, our findings suggest three key conclusions. Firstly, while opportunities may arise as a 
result of a changing climate, these are not perceived to be as important as equivalent threats. Taking 
advantage of them is, therefore, not likely to be perceived as a priority, even where experts project that 
they will have high positive consequence. Secondly, while both experts and members of the wider 
public expect future increases in flooding to pose a high risk to the UK, UK residents do not appear 
to expect future increases in heat extremes to pose as strong a risk as experts. As noted, this may be 
attributable to wet weather being perceived as both unpleasant and memorable, while hot weather 
evokes more positive emotions (Lefevre et al. 2015). It does, however, raise the concern that those living 
in temperate climates may be less prepared – and less willing to prepare – for future heat extremes 
than for future flood risks. Previous research has suggested that stressing the unpleasant aspects of 
hot weather can increase intention to protect oneself against short-term weather extremes amongst 
UK residents (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2016). However, as of yet this strategy has not been tested with 
respect to increasing preparedness for longer term changes in climate. Lastly, our findings suggest that 
support for measures to prepare for specific climate change impacts may be driven more by perceived 
magnitudes of the threats posed, than by the stated likelihood of them occurring. Additionally, while 
climate change beliefs are linked to greater concern about specific impacts, they do not predict will-
ingness to prioritise any specific type of impact.
Our findings have implications for climate risk communication and policy. When promoting support 
for adaptation measures, highlighting the potential consequences of specific threats may be more 
effective than emphasising climate change in general or the likelihood of specific climate change 
impacts by a particular point in time. For instance, it has been suggested that emphasising local flood 
risks can increase support for flood risk adaptation measures across groups with polarised beliefs about 
climate change (Bruine de Bruin, Wong-Parodi, and Morgan 2014). Such communication approaches 
would seem to be supported by research on the ‘time to emergence’ of climate signals. Specifically, that 
while there is uncertainty as to when the signal from anthropogenic climate change will exceed natural 
variability in different climate variables, exceedance of these thresholds is expected to be linked to 
major climate change impacts (Hawkins and Sutton 2012). Hence, communicators who aim to increase 
public support for adaptation measures may therefore need to stress the point in time at which it is 
virtually certain that specific impacts will have occurred, rather than the likelihood of them having 
occurred by a particular date. Indeed, support for climate change mitigation is higher among recipients 
of communications that discuss the seriousness of climate change impacts ‘when’ (rather than ‘if’) they 
occur under different emissions scenarios (Ballard and Lewandowsky 2015). More research is needed 
to test whether this also applies to communications about adaptation. Our findings also underscore 
the importance of taking a region-specific approach to exploring public expectations about climate 
change impacts. Hence, we suggest that a similar approach might be taken in comparing expert impact 
assessments to public expectations in other countries.
Note
1.  As all participants were assigned 10 out of 19 impacts, they were not asked to distribute resources amongst the 
same set of impacts. This means individual participants may have allocated a different number of resource units 
to any given impact had it been part of a different set of 10. However, combined with the large sample size, the 
fact that impact assignment was randomised means that this will not have led to any systematic biasing of the 
responses in the data-set as a whole.
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